jeudi 16 juin 2011

Jesus-Christ arrêté en Grèce

Bon allez, il faut bien plaisanter de temps en temps...

mardi 14 juin 2011

La crise globale et systémique a-t-elle été voulue et organisée? - Le blog de la crise qui arrive

The Fed's Most Dangerous Game: Checkmate

The Fed's Most Dangerous Game: Checkmate
The Fed can only choose the least-worst option now: either destroy the real economy by sinking the dollar below support and unleashing the Inflation Monster, or abandon the 'risk trade' stock market rally.

The Fed's game plan--sink the U.S. dollar to goose corporate profits, reinflate asset prices and create 'modest inflation'--is now the most dangerous game on Earth. As overleveraged assets from real estate to stocks imploded in 2008 and early 2009, the Federal Reserve rushed to flood the global economy with zero-interest dollars. This did a number of things the Fed reckoned were necessary:

1. It gave U.S. banks and other insolvent financial institutions an unlimited pool of money to borrow at zero interest and leave on deposit at the Fed, where it earned risk-free interest.

2. It enabled a vast global 'carry trade' in dollars: speculators could borrow unlimited dollars at no cost, and then deploy the cash around the world to chase higher yields in stocks, commodities, etc.

3. It allowed banks to lend profitably in the U.S., as their cost of money was reduced to essentially zero, and to pour 'hot money' into U.S. stocks, creating a virtuous cycle of ever-rising equity prices.

4. With the bulk of U.S. corporations' growth and earnings coming from overseas sales, then a plummeting dollar boosted their profits effortlessly, further goosing U.S. stocks.

5. With savings earning nothing, U.S. investors were driven into the 'risk trades' of the stock market and commodities, a flow of funds which reinflated asset bubbles. This reinflation was critical to foster the appearance of widespread 'recovery' via the 'wealth effect' of rising asset prices.

6. A rising stock market not only offered an illusion of 'growth' but it bailed out pension funds and set the stage for Wall Street to reap billions of dollars from the resurgence of mergers and acquisitions, IPOs and derivatives.

The basic idea was to extend the game plan which had worked in the last banking crisis in the early 1980s: don't force the banks to declare their losses, but 'extend and pretend' while offering them risk-free ways to bank billions in profits. The goal was to enable the banks to recapitalize 'painlessly' on the backs of consumers and taxpayers.

The other goal of the plan was to create some modest inflation by brute-force depreciation of the nation's currency. This inflation would be 'good' because it would enable debtors to pay off their debts with cheaper dollars, and it would also serve to reinvigorate the 'animal spirits' of borrowing and spending the Fed views as the bedrock of the 'permanent growth' economy.

If you're confident that your cash will be worth less next year, you're highly incentivized to spend it now rather than see its purchasing power decline.

But in choosing to depreciate the dollar, the Fed engaged in a high-stakes game with potentially devastating consequences. By pushing the dollar down to near-historic lows, the Fed now risks a destabilizing criticality: if the dollar breaks key support levels, then traders and holders everywhere will have great uncertainties about how low it might drop. That will encourage them to sell their dollars immediately rather than hold on to find out how low it might fall.

As we can see in this chart, the dollar's decline has not occurred in a vaccum: when the dollar declines, oil and gasoline shoot up. The dollar and oil (and other essential commodities) are on a see-saw, for oil exporters simply raise prices to compensate for the loss of purchasing power as the dollar declines. (Chart courtesy of

The Fed is now trapped: if it crushes the dollar any lower, then oil will jump toward its 2008 highs around $140/barrel--a level that triggers recession in the 'real' U.S. economy. A recession will disembowel the 'recovery' and all the rest of the Fed's carefully nurtured props of 'prosperity.'

The unintended consequences of the Fed's inflationary plan to depreciate the dollar is evident everywhere in skyrocketing food and energy costs. Destroying the dollar has sparked destabilizing global inflation which threatens to spin out of control.

But if they let the dollar rise, then their precious stock market rally implodes. And what's left of the mirage of 'recovery' if the 'wealth effect' evaporates? Zip, zero, nada.

Here is a long-term chart of the dollar, courtesy of Harun I. I have added a few notes.

Note the long-term downtrend. No wonder 97% of the pundits and punters are bearish. The 'line in the sand' is not far below current levels: if the Fed pushes the dollar below this level, technically there is no visible support, and oil will be on its way to $200/barrel, far past the point it pushes the economy into recession.

Many technicians have noted the wedge/flag pattern in the dollar's recent action. Price usually breaks out of a flag in a major move either up or down.

Also of interest is the extended period of indecision traced out between 1988-1994. In a macro perspective, this mirrored the trends and counter-trends in the U.S. and global economy.

The dollar has again traced out a similar period of indecision since 2004--roughly seven years. That suggests the possibility that a key inflection point is close at hand--the same conclusion drawn from the flag-pennant-wedge formation.

The Fed now has to choose between two bad options: either keep pushing down the dollar and let oil's inevitable rise trigger a recession, or let the dollar recover and watch stocks crater as the 'risk trades' reverse.

If the dollar Bears have to cover their short bets, the ensuing rally in the dollar might well be explosive and self-reinforcing. I addressed this possibility in A Contrarian Take on the Dollar's Demise (March 25, 2011).

If the Fed lets the dollar depreciate in an uncontrolled fashion, then we may well end up with the hyper-inflation (loss of faith) that many expect. My question remains: what course of action will benefit those issuing the whispered orders to their lackeys and toadies on the Fed and in Congress? Will a disorderly and disruptive collapse of the dollar serve the Financial Power Elites' best interests? I don't see how it would. Rather, I see it wreaking great damage on their holdings.

Thus it wouldn't surprise me in the least were the Fed to shock the markets with a 'surprise' rate increase within the next few weeks or months. Destroying the real economy to maintain the 'risk trades' is a foolhardy way to close down a lose-lose position.

Harun sheds additional light on the broader contexts in his commentary:
Have you ever played chess against someone who refuses to resign even though he or she is down so many pieces chances of winning are zero. All they do is keep moving out of check until there is no more room and they are finally checkmated?

What happens if rates rise? At the time of a loan the principle is created, the interest is not, therefore, everyone who needs to borrow tremendous amounts of money to service existing debt (most of western Europe and the US) will not be able to, therefore there will be cascading defaults of unprecedented amounts. Governments would collapse seemingly overnight. If the game is to continue, there must be enough credit expansion create enough 'money' to make interest payments and create so called 'growth'. Which brings us to...

Inflating the currency: As with the chess player above, it merely holds off the inevitable. Why is it 'different' this time? Why has the system become so intolerant to the smallest adverse moves? Answer: Leverage. At 1:1 leverage 100 percent has to be lost to achieve ruin. At 1:2 50 percent must be lost. Jump to 1:40 leverage and only a 2 percent loss brings about ruin.

So what is our leverage? First, we must stop this version of off balance sheet accounting. This version of private household accounting keeps off the liability side of its balance sheet the federal deficit. It is also further skewed by dispersing the federal deficit amongst every person in the US. When is the last time a person bought a house and turned to their infant in the stroller happily using its toes as a pacifier and said, 'your portion of this mortgage is $25,000.00?'

If total debt, private and public were carried on household balance sheets and divided only among the productive, i.e. employed, the reality of it would change the conversation dramatically. What would be realized is that the US and most of Western Europe is hopelessly over-leveraged and it is only a matter of time before the structural instability created by this leverage manifests in some unpleasant way.

And no, the answer does not lie in a one world currency. Without getting rid of current levels of debt we would run into Dr. Bartlett's analogy of microbes doubling every minute in a bottle. How much time would it take to fill three more bottles. Well, in the first minute the first new bottle would be full, and in the next minute the two remaining bottles would be full (remember, they are doubling). So if debt levels remain the same debt must double in order to service existing debt and providing growth.

This is why California and other states keep running into problems they thought they fixed. While they make minimalist cuts to spending those cuts are outstripped by the exponential growth of the interest on existing debt. This is also why the current deal in congress is an insult to every intelligent adult in America. Interest on the debt will consume that $33 billion spending cut in no time at all.

BTW, this is the same reason why discovering a brand new super-giant oil field will not matter if demand growth continues at a constant rate. Any and all growth is exponential and therefore will continuously double at some point.

The DXY yearly chart (not shown) shows that bulls have not been able to force a test of the previous three year highs. The quarterly chart shows bears have been able to push price down breaking quarterly lows to important support. What happens next depends. If historical support is broken then the probability increases that price will continue down and things get really interesting. If support holds or if price dips below support enough to get those stops and then move back up through support turned resistance the probability increases there will be a sharp rally as bears cover. But this tells only a portion of the story.

Look at what has happened while the DXY has been range bound. In the case of energy (and just about all other commodities) the DXY has underperformed dramatically. More specifically if you stayed in cash, the cost of gasoline has gone up four fold since the bottom in 2009.

Do this exercise across the commodity spectrum and the results will be roughly the same. So the question is, how long can can the current course be maintained?
Thank you, Harun. As I wrote Harun, it's Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's move, but he faces a cruel dilemma: if he moves his king out of check, he will lose his queen.

There are only bad choices left, Mr. Bernanke. That's the consequence of playing the world's most dangerous game with the dollar, grain and oil.

Guest Post: The Fed's Most Dangerous Game: Checkmate: "
Submitted by Charles Hugh Smith from Of Two Minds

vendredi 3 juin 2011

Did The Fed Print Money In QE1 And QE2?

Did The Fed Print Money In QE1 And QE2?: "

printingmoney tbi

In a Wednesday opinion piece in the WSJ, George Melloan, a former columnist and deputy editor of the Journal’s editorial page, penned a piece opining on the policy problem the Federal Reserve has gotten
itself into with its QE1 and QE2. 

His concern is one that we at Cumberland pointed out more than a year ago.  That is, in returning to a normal policy regime and reducing the amount of high-powered money in the system, the Fed will have to shrink its balance sheet. 

But doing so by selling assets while raising interest rates, which seems to be the latest plan outlined in the most recent FOMC minutes, the Fed will incur capital losses, and this may inhibit its will to begin to return to a more normal policy stance.  Indeed, for about two years now we have been tracking weekly the estimated duration of the Federal Reserve’s capital and the amount of flexibility the Fed would have to raise rates before the market value of its assets exceeded the value of its liabilities.

Our current calculations indicate that this would happen if the term structure shifted up by about 40 basis points.  This is far less than the increase that would be required to return to a normal interest-rate/policy regime.  There is nothing new in either Melloan’s concern or the work by Ford and Todd in Forbes that he appears to have relied upon to support his argument.

While Melloan’s concerns are valid, his comparison of the Fed to a normal commercial bank, and particularly the argument that the Fed has not printed money to engage in QE1 and QE2 but rather has borrowed money from banks at obscenely low interest rates, is totally wrong.

In the fall of 2008, during the financial crisis, the Fed engaged in a number of special-purpose programs – namely the Term Discount Window Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, the Term Auction Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and three programs to acquire asset-backed securities, and engaged in reciprocal currency swaps with foreign central banks.  As a result, the Fed’s assets expanded from about $900 billion before the crisis to nearly $2.5 trillion.  The corresponding increase in Federal Reserve liabilities
was accounted for by a $600 billion increase in bank excess reserves, and the remainder was in the form of reverse repos.  In effect, made loans and did so by giving the bank borrower a deposit at the Fed, thereby printing high-powered money.

It is important to recognize that once created, deposits at the Fed can only be significantly reduced by one of six mechanisms: a reduction in private bank borrowings from the Fed, a sale of assets by the Fed, a conversion of deposits at the Fed into currency, a shrinkage in the size of the U.S. banking system, a temporary reverse repo with the private sector by the Fed, or a reduction in outstanding swap lines with foreign central banks.  All other private entity transactions do not create or destroy deposits at the Fed, but simply change their ownership.

Perhaps the clearest example of printing money, to illustrate the point, is the reciprocal currency swap program the Fed entered into during the financial crisis with several foreign central banks.  The ECB, for example, gave the Fed a euro deposit at the ECB in return for a dollar deposit at the Fed.  Accounting-wise, the ECB’s liabilities went up by the amount of the euro deposit granted to the Fed, while its assets went up by the dollar amount of the deposit it received from the Fed. 

Similarly, the Fed’s assets went up by the amount of its euro currency holdings at the ECB, and its dollar liabilities went up reflecting the dollar deposit it had granted to the ECB.  Both central banks printed money.  The ECB then used its newly acquired dollars to provide dollar loans to European banks.  When the ECB made a dollar loan to a foreign bank, the ownership of the dollar deposit at the Fed shifted from the ECB to the borrowing foreign bank.  When the loan was paid back, the ownership of the dollar deposit shifted back to the ECB, the swap transaction was reversed and the assets and liabilities of both central banks returned to their pre-swap levels.

The Fed’s emergency lending programs phased out as loan programs shrank and reverse repos were retired.  Had the Fed not embarked upon QE1 and subsequently QE2, its balance sheet would have shrunk.  But with the start of QE1 and QE2 the rundown in the Fed’s assets due to shrinkage of its lending programs was offset by the simultaneous purchase of agency mortgage-backed securities and purchases of
long-term Treasuries. In fact, those purchased exceeded the amount of outstanding emergency loans the Fed had previously granted.

From an accounting perspective, the loan programs shrank, excess reserves were retired, and the Fed simultaneously reprinted money to purchase the MBS and Treasury securities.  It did not borrow money
from commercial banks.  Put another way, the money printed to fund the emergency loan programs, and more, was morphed into MBS and Treasury securities and this is clearly shown in a chart of the Fed’s assets:


Think about it.  Where would the excess reserves come from that banks held with the Federal Reserve, if the Fed hadn’t originally made the emergency loans or subsequently purchased assets?  If Mr. Melloan’s
analysis were correct, the excess reserves, which are assets to the private banking system, would have had to come from shrinkage of their assets and deposits, thereby turning required reserves into excess reserves, or by keeping their balance sheets the same size and shifting the composition of their assets by reducing loans and securities and increasing their reserves at the Federal Reserve.

Just before the crisis in August 2007, banks held only $45 billion in total reserves, and $40 billion of that was in the form of required reserves.  Clearly, shrinkage of deposits could not have funded the huge increase in excess reserves in the banking system that came with the Fed’s emergency lending programs.  What about a shift in the composition of bank assets from loans and securities to deposits at
the Fed? Data show that while bank loans have declined by about $600 billion, securities holdings have increased by about $600 billion. Therefore, the so-called borrowing from commercial banks could not
have come from declines in their securities and loans.

So, George Melloan has totally mischaracterized the source of funding for the Federal Reserve’s QE1 and QE2 asset purchases.  The Fed first printed high powered money through its emergency lending programs and as those programs were phased out the Fed again purchased agency mortgage-backed securities and Treasuries from the public by printing money, and the proceeds of those purchases show up as customer
deposits in banks, with the offsetting asset being not new loans but excess reserves held at the Fed.

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